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Abstract
Following Russell, philosophers like Moltmann, Jubien, Boër, and Newman analyse
‘John believes that Mary is French’ as ‘R (John, the property of being French, Mary)’,
instead of analysing it as ‘R (John, thatMary is French)’. Thus, for these philosophers,
instead of relations holding between agents and truth-bearing entities (propositions),
propositional attitude verbs, like ‘belief’, express relations holding between agents
and the properties and objects our thoughts and speech acts are about. This is also
known as the Multiple Relation Theory. In this paper, I will discuss the Multiple
Relation Theory primarily in connection with a problem known as Schiffer’s puzzle.
Schiffer first presented the puzzle to argue against the so called direct-reference theory
of belief reports advocated, among others, by Salmon and Braun. I will argue that,
unlike the direct-reference theory of belief reports, the Multiple Relation Theory does
not provide a solution to Schiffer’s puzzle. In this connection, I will also discuss a
slight modification of the Multiple Relation Theory according to which the ways the
properties and objects our thoughts and speech acts are about are presented to us are
part of the truth-conditions of sentences like ‘John believes that Mary is French’. We
will see that prima facie such a contextualist version of the Multiple Relation Theory
provides a solution to Schiffer’s puzzle. However, concluding, I will argue with new
Schiffer cases that, ultimately, also a contextualist version of the Multiple Relation
Theory cannot explain all instances of Schiffer’s puzzle. This will undermine the
Multiple Relation Theory in general.








FollowingRussell (1912,1913, 1918), philosophers likeMoltmann (2003, 2013, Chap.
4), Jubien (2001), Boër (2002), and Newman (2002) analyse (1) as (2a), instead of
analysing (1) as (2b).1
(1) John believes that Mary is French.
(2a) R (John, λx [x is French], Mary).
(2b) R (John, that Mary is French).
Thus, for these philosophers, instead of relations holding between agents and truth-
bearing entities (propositions), propositional attitude verbs, like ‘belief’, express
relations holding between agents and the properties and objects our thoughts and
speech acts are about. For example, in (Moltmann 2003), Moltmann treats proposi-
tional attitude verbs, like ‘belief’ as syncategorematic expressions which, if, in the
simplest case, the that-clause has a propositional content consisting of an n-place
relation and n arguments, will specify an (n + 2)-place relation R(bel,n+2) as in (M)
(Moltmann 2003, p. 94, pp. 96–97):
(M) For an n-place relation R′ and entities d1, . . . , dn ,
[[believes, 〈R′, d1, . . . , dn〉]] = λx[R(bel,n+2)(x, R′, d1, . . . , dn)].
The claim that propositional attitude verbs, like ‘belief’, express relations holding
between agents and the properties and objects our thoughts and speech acts are about
is also known as the Multiple Relation Theory.2
There are various reasons why philosophers have advocated or still advocate the
Multiple Relation Theory. For example, in (Moltmann 2003), Moltmann reintroduces
the Multiple Relation Theory, among others, to explain that inferences like the infer-
ences in (3) aren’t logically valid.
3a. John remembers that Mary is French.
John remembers the proposition that Mary is French.
3b. John wishes that Mary is French.
John wishes the proposition that Mary is French.
1 Lebens (2017) advocates a Multiple Relation Theory for belief without advocating a Multiple Relation
Theory for belief ascriptions; i.e. without analysing (1) as (2a). In this paper, my discussion of the Multiple
Relation Theory will be restricted to the Multiple Relation Theory as a theory of belief ascriptions; i.e.
to theories of belief ascriptions that analyse (1) as (2a). I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for
pointing this out to me.
2 An alternative to (M) would be to say that propositional attitude verbs, like ‘belief’ are multigrade
predicates (Moltmann 2013, Chap. 4). This requires the distinction between places and positions (cf. Oliver
and Smiley 2004). For example, ‘believe’ would be a relation that has two places, and it would bemultigrade
in its second place. All this won’t affect my discussion of the Multiple Relation Theory.
Note that Moltmann no longer holds that propositional attitude verbs, like ‘belief’ express relations holding
between agents, properties, and objects. Instead, Moltmann analyses (1) as (2c), where ‘believe’ takes as
its implicit Davidsonian event argument an act of believing, product is a function mapping that act onto its
product, Ralph’s belief, and [thatMary is French] is a property of such products, specifying their satisfaction
conditions (Moltmann 2017).
(2c) ∃e (believes (e, Ralph) & [that Mary is French] (product(e))).
For Moltmann’s reasons to abandon the Multiple Relation Theory see (Moltmann 2017, App. 2).
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Since, according to the Relational Analysis, the premises in (3) are true if and only if
John remembers/wishes the proposition that Mary is French, the Relational Analysis
cannot explain this. According to Moltmann, this suggests that the premises in (3)
have to be analysed as (2a), instead of analysing them as (2b). First of all, this would
explain that the inferences in (3) aren’t logically valid. Moreover, it would also explain
that, unlike their conclusion, the premises of (3a) and (3b) specify the content of the
attitude in question. Moltmann calls this ‘the Objectivization Effect’: Unlike the that-
clause in the premises of (3), the complement in the conclusions of (3) “specifies not
the mere content of the attitude, but the object the attitude is about or directed toward”
(Moltmann 2003, p. 87).
Against the Multiple Relation Theory, it has been objected that what is judged or
believed must be capable of being true or false. Since a collection of things, like the
collection of Mary and the property of being happy, is not capable of being true or
false, it has been concluded that the relata of the belief relation cannot be the properties
and objects our thoughts and speech acts are about (see, for example, Hanks 2007, p.
140). Moltmann (2003, pp. 105–106) responds to this objection that attitude verbs,
like ‘belief’, express modes of predication. For example, according to Moltmann,
believing that Mary is happy is predicating, in the belief mode, the property of being
happy of Mary. Since here predication is understood as an intentional act aiming at
truth, according to Moltmann, the primary bearers of truth are not the relata of the
belief relation, but the concrete acts of believing.3 In this way, an advocate of the
Multiple Relation Theory could explain that beliefs are true or false without being
committed to the claim that the objects of belief are truth-bearing entities.
In this paper, I won’t go into detail about the different arguments for and against
the Multiple Relation Theory that have been discussed in the literature. Instead, I will
discuss the Multiple Relation Theory primarily in connection with a problem known
as Schiffer’s puzzle. Schiffer (2006) first presented the puzzle to argue against the so
called direct-reference theory of belief reports advocated, among others, by Salmon
(1986) and Braun (1998). I will argue that, unlike the direct-reference theory of belief
reports, the Multiple Relation Theory does not provide a solution to Schiffer’s puzzle.
In this connection, I will also discuss a slight modification of the Multiple Relation
Theory according towhich theways the properties and objects our thoughts and speech
acts are about are presented to us are part of the truth-conditions of sentences like (1).
We will see that prima facie such a contextualist version of the Multiple Relation
Theory provides a solution to Schiffer’s puzzle. However, concluding, I will argue
with new Schiffer cases that, ultimately, also the contextualist version of the Multiple
Relation Theory cannot explain all instances of Schiffer’s puzzle. Together with the
result that also the non-contextualist version of theMultiple Relation Theory, i.e. (M),
does not provide a solution to Schiffer’s puzzle, this will undermine the Multiple
Relation Theory in general.
The paper is structured as follows: In Sect. 2, I will argue that the Multiple Rela-
tion Theory is committed to what Schiffer calls ‘the special-case consequence’ and
‘Frege’s constraint’. Following this, in Sect. 3, I will argue with an example from
3 In chapter 12 of The Problems of Philosophy, Russell seems to hold a similar view, since he argues that
a world of mere matter would only contain facts, but no truths or falsehoods. I would like to thank an
anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me.
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Schiffer that together with the special-case consequence and Frege’s constraint the
non-contextualist version of theMultiple Relation Theory, i.e. (M), leads to contradic-
tions. This is Schiffer’s puzzle. In Sect. 4, I will argue that, unlike the direct-reference
theory of belief reports, the non-contextualist version of the Multiple Relation Theory
does not provide a solution to Schiffer’s puzzle. Following this (Sect. 5), I will discuss
a contextualist version of the Multiple Relation Theory, and I will argue with new
Schiffer cases that, ultimately, also a contextualist version of the Multiple Relation
Theory cannot solve Schiffer’s puzzle.
2 The special-case consequence and Frege’s constraint
The starting point of Schiffer’s puzzle is a problem regarding de re belief which also
arises within the Multiple Relation Theory. For example, both (4) and (5) can be true;
e.g. if Ralph sincerely and reflectively utters both ‘Karol Wojtyła is Polish’ and ‘It is
not the case that John Paul II. is Polish’.
(4) Ralph believes that Karol Wojtyła is Polish.
(5) Ralph disbelieves4that John Paul II. is Polish.
Moreover, it seems that according to theMultipleRelationTheory de re belief is simply
a special case of de dicto belief. For example, if (4) is true, then, according to (M),
Ralph stands in the three-place belief relation R(bel,3) to the property of being Polish
and Karol Wojtyła.5 Since this seems to be tantamount to saying that Karol Wojtyła
4 Here ‘disbelieve’ is defined in terms of ‘believe’. For example, to disbelieve that John Paul II. is Polish
means to believe that it is not the case that John Paul II. is Polish. There are different ways to spell this
out within the Multiple Relation Theory. For example, Moltmann (2003, p. 99) introduces proposition-like
entities, so called attitudinal objects, in order to define ‘believe’ for connectives, like negation, conjunction,
and disjunction. According to this account, connectives are predicates expressing properties of attitudinal
objects or relations holding between attitudinal objects. Thus, if the that-clause has a propositional content
consisting of a structured proposition and the property expressed by the negation-predicate, i.e. the property
of being false, ‘believe’ will specify a three-place relation as in MNeg , where f (Rent , p, A) is an attitudinal
object such that f is a function taking the entertaining relation, Rent , a structured proposition p, and a kind
of agent A as arguments and returning there being an agent of kind A standing in Rent to the constituents
of p:
(MNeg) For a structured proposition p,
[[believes, 〈[[Neg]], p〉]] = {x |R(bel,3)(x, [[Neg]], f (Rent , p, A))}.
Following this, ‘disbelieve’ can be defined as follows, where 〈〈d1, . . . , dn〉, R′〉 is the structured proposition
consisting of the relation R′ and the objects d1, . . . , dn :
(Mdis ) (a) For an n-place relation R
′ and entities d1, . . . , dn ,
[[disbelieves, 〈R′, d1, . . . , dn〉]] = λx[R(dis,n+2)(x, R′, d1, . . . , dn)].
(b) For an n-place relation R′ and entities d1, . . . , dn ,
λx[R(dis,n+2)(x, R′, d1, . . . , dn)] = {x |R(bel,3)(x, [[Neg]], f (Rent , 〈〈d1, . . . , dn〉, R′〉, A))}.
5 Strictly speaking, this presupposes that the propositional content of ‘Karol Wojtyła is Polish’ consists
of the property of being Polish and Karol Wojtyła; i.e. that names are directly referential terms. Not all
advocates of the Multiple Relation Theory accept this. For example, according to Jubien (2001), the relata
of the belief relation are always properties and relations and never individuals. Something similar is true of
Russell’s original version of the Multiple Relation Theory. For example, according to Russell (1912), the
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is believed by Ralph to be someone such that he is Polish, the Multiple Relation
Theory seems to be committed to what Schiffer (2006, p. 362) calls ‘the special-case
consequence’:
The Special-Case Consequence (S): Necessarily, if α believes/disbelieves that φβ ,
then β is believed/disbelieved by α to be (some-
thing/someone) such that φβ/i t .
Hereα is any singular termofEnglish,β is any proper nameor other directly referential
term of English, φi t is any English open sentence in which the pronoun ‘it’ occurs as
a free variable – alternatively ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘him’ or ‘her’ – and φβ is the same as φi t
except for having occurrences of β wherever φi t has free occurrences of the relevant
pronoun. If (4) and (5) are true, then, according to (S), so are (6) and (7).
(6) Karol Wojtyła is believed by Ralph to be someone such that he is Polish.
(7) John Paul II. is disbelieved by Ralph to be someone such that he is Polish.
Since John Paul II. = Karol Wojtyła, and since we can simply assume that Ralph is
both a brilliant logician, i.e. that he is in principle in a position to notice and cor-
rect contradictory beliefs, and fully rational, i.e. that he would never let contradictory
beliefs pass if he recognises them as such, this leads to the question how a brilliant
logician like Ralph can rationally both believe and disbelieve an object o to be (some-
thing/someone) such that φi t . I will call this ‘the problem of rationality regarding de
re belief’.
The received solution to the problem of rationality regarding de re belief says that
Wojtyła is presented to Ralph by two modes of presentation m and m′ without him
recognising thatm andm′ are modes of presentation of one and the same person. Since
Ralph believesWojtyła to be Polish underm and disbelievesWojtyła to be Polish under
m′, the solution continues, Ralph cannot be convicted of irrationality. Schiffer calls
this ‘Frege’s constraint’ (Schiffer 2006, p. 362):6
(FC) If an object o is rationally both believed and disbelieved by an agent k to be
(something/someone) such that φi t , then there are two modes of presentation
m and m′ such that
(a) o is believed by k to be (something/someone) such that φi t under m,
(b) o is disbelieved by k to be (something/someone) such that φi t under m′, and
(c) k does not recognise that m and m′ are modes of presentation of one and the
same object.
Footnote 5 continued
only directly referential terms are so called logically proper names; i.e. demonstratives like ‘this’ and ‘that’
which refer to sense-data or other objects of immediate acquaintance. Nowadays, however, most advocates
of the Multiple Relation Theory would accept that the propositional content of ‘Karol Wojtyła is Polish’
consists of the property of being Polish and Karol Wojtyła; i.e. that, in addition to Russell’s logically proper
names, also ordinary proper names, like ‘Karol Wojtyła’ and ‘John Paul II.’, are directly referential terms.
I will return to this later.
6 Frege’s constraint leaves open what modes of presentation are, and what it is for o to be believed by k to
be (something/someone) such that φi t under m. Rather, the notion of a mode of presentation is functionally
defined by Frege’s constraint; i.e. something is a mode of presentation if it plays the role defined by Frege’s
constraint. I will return to this later.
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Taken in its obvious intent, Frege’s constraint appears to be a self-evident truth. If an
agent k rationally believes o to be (something/someone) such that φi t and disbelieves
o′ to be (something/someone) such that φi t , then, in so doing, k takes o and o′ to be
distinct. Insofar as k is rational, he/she thereby takes o and o′ differently, even if, in
fact, o = o′. Thus, in addition to the special-case consequence, the Multiple Relation
Theory also seems to be committed to Frege’s constraint.
Following Frege’s constraint, advocates of the Multiple Relation Theory have two
options. First, they could claim that the modes of presentation implied by Frege’s
constraint are part of the truth-conditions of sentences like (4) and (5) and (6) and (7)
(respectively). In this case, advocates of the Multiple Relation Theory would have to
reject (M), and, instead, hold something along the lines of (M ′) (Moltmann 2003, p.
97).7
(M ′) For an n-place relation R′, entities d1, . . . , dn and (types of) modes of presenta-
tion T ′, T1, . . . , Tn ,
[[believes/disbelieves, 〈〈R′, T ′〉, 〈d1, T1〉, . . . , 〈dn, Tn〉〉]]
= λx[R(bel/dis,n+2)(x, 〈R′, T ′〉, 〈d1, T1〉, . . . , 〈dn, Tn〉)]. 8
7 As Moltmann (2003, p. 98) rightly points out, this is a deviation from the spirit of Russell’s original
analysis, since Russell’s aim was to avoid modes of presentation. Moreover, one could object that according
to (M ′) the relata of the belief relation are pseudo entities, i.e. ordered pairs consisting of objects and modes
of presentation. Thus, the objection goes, according to (M ′), John’s believing that Mary is French is not a
way the world is or might be, but rather a technical artifact. An advocate of the Multiple Relation Theory
could respond that there are other ways to claim that the modes of presentation implied by Frege’s constraint
are part of the truth-conditions of sentences like (4) and (5) and (6) and (7). For example, an advocate of
the Multiple Relation Theory could hold something along the lines of (M ′′):
(M ′′) For an n-place relation R′, entities d1, . . . , dn and (types of) modes of presentation T ′, T1, . . . , Tn ,
[[believes/disbelieves, 〈R′, d1, . . . , dn , T ′, T1, . . . , Tn〉]] = λx[R(bel/dis,2n+3)(x, R′, d1, . . . , dn ,
T ′, T1, . . . , Tn)].
According to this version of the Multiple Relation Theory, (1) has to be analysed as (2d), where T is a
mode of presentation of the property of being French and T ′ is a mode of presentation of Mary:
(2d) R(bel,5) (John, λx [x is French], Mary, T, T’)
(2d) could then be read as John believes that Mary is French under T and T ′, where the relata of the belief
relation are not pseudo entities anymore, but objects, properties/relations, and modes of presentation of
objects and properties/relations. Nevertheless, in what follows, I will discuss (M ′) as an alternative to (M),
since this won’t affect my discussion of the Multiple Relation Theory. I would like to thank an anonymous
reviewer for pointing this objection to (M ′) out.
8 Again, ‘disbelieve’ has to be defined in terms of ‘believe’ by first defining ‘believe’ for negation as in
M ′Neg , where T is a mode of presentation of the structured proposition p:
(M ′Neg) For a structured proposition p and a (type of) mode of presentation T ,
[[believes, 〈[[Neg]], 〈p, T 〉〉]] = {x |R(bel,3)(x, [[Neg]], 〈 f (Rent , p, A), T 〉)}.
Following this, R(dis,n+2) can be defined as follows, where 〈〈d1, . . . , dn〉, R′〉 is again the structured
proposition consisting of the relation R′ and the objects d1, . . . , dn , and 〈〈T1, . . . , Tn〉, T ′〉 is a mode of
presentation of this structured proposition consisting of modes of presentations of its parts:
(M ′dis ) For an n-place relation R′, entities d1, . . . , dn and (types of) modes of presentation T ′,
T1, . . . , Tn ,
λx[R(dis,n+2)(x, 〈R′, T ′〉, 〈d1, T1〉, . . . , 〈dn , Tn〉)]
= {x |R(bel,3)(x, [[Neg]], 〈 f (Rent , 〈〈d1, . . . , dn〉, R′〉, A), 〈〈T1, . . . , Tn〉, T ′〉〉)}.
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The second option is to stick with (M), and, thus, to claim that the modes of presen-
tation implied byFrege’s constraint are not part of the truth-conditions of sentences like
(4) and (5) and (6) and (7) (respectively). Nevertheless, just like (M ′), (M) is consistent
with Frege’s constraint. For example, an advocate of (M) could claim that R(bel,n+2)
is the existential generalization of a relation R′(bel,n+2) involving the modes of presen-
tation implied by Frege’s constraint; i.e. that for all x : R(bel,n+2)(x, R′, d1, . . . , dn)
if and only if there are (types of) modes of presentation T ′, T1, . . . , Tn such that
R′(bel,n+2)(x, 〈R′, T ′〉, 〈d1, T1〉, . . . , 〈dn, Tn〉).9 In this way, (M) would provide a solu-
tion to the problem of rationality regarding de re belief via Frege’s constraint without
being committed to the claim that the modes of presentation implied by Frege’s con-
straint are part of the truth-conditions of sentences like (4) and (5) and (6) and (7)
(respectively).
Although both (M) and (M ′) can explain how (4) and (5) can be true of a brilliant
and fully rational logician like Ralph, unlike (M), (M ′) could also explain that there
can be circumstances in which (4) is true and (8) is false.
(4) Ralph believes that Karol Wojtyła is Polish.
(8) Ralph believes that John Paul II. is Polish.
For example, if Ralph is disposed to sincerely and reflectively utter ‘Karol Wojtyła
is Polish’ without being disposed to sincerely and reflectively utter ‘John Paul II. is
Polish’, we have strong intuitions that (4) is true and (8) is false. However, since,
according to (M), both (4) and (8) have the logical form in (9), (M) could not explain
this.
(9) R(bel,3) (Ralph, λx [x is Polish], Karol Wojtyła).
This is also known as Frege’s puzzle.
In (Moltmann 2003, p. 97), Moltmann solves Frege’s puzzle by replacing (M) with
(M ′). For example, according to (M ′), (4) has to be analysed as (10), and (8) has
to be analysed as (11), where TK W and T ′K W are two distinct (contextually deter-
mined) (types of) modes of presentation of Karol Wojtyła, and TPol is a (contextually
determined) (type of) mode of presentation of the property of being Polish.
(10) R(bel,3) (Ralph, 〈λx [x is Polish], TPol〉, 〈Karol Wojtyła, TK W 〉).
(11) R(bel,3) (Ralph, 〈λx [x is Polish], TPol〉, 〈Karol Wojtyła, T ′K W 〉).
Since there can be circumstances in which (10) is true and (11) is false, in this way, an
advocate of theMultipleRelationTheory could explain how there canbe circumstances
in which (4) is true and (8) is false. Such a solution to Frege’s puzzle is also called a
‘contextualist solution to Frege’s puzzle’. Therefore, I will call (M ′) ‘the contextualist
version of the Multiple Relation Theory’.10
9 See for example (Salmon 1986) for a discussion of a similar theory of belief in connection with the
direct-reference theory of belief reports. There Salmon claims that the two-place belief relation holding
between agents and Russellian propositions is the existential generalization of a three-place belief relation
holding between agents, Russellian propositions, and propositional modes of presentation; i.e. that an agent
x believes a proposition p if and only if there is a mode of presentation m of p such that x believes p under
m.
10 Note that also a contextualist version of the Multiple Relation Theory could explain that the inferences
in (3) aren’t logically valid. Since, just like the RelationalAnalysis, a contextualist version of the Relational
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The alternative to a contextualist solution to Frege’s puzzle is a naive solution to
Frege’s puzzle. According to a naive solution to Frege’s puzzle, (4) is true if and only if
(8) is true; i.e. according to a naive solution to Frege’s puzzle, our intuitions regarding
the truth-values of sentences like (4) and (8) can be misleading (see, for example,
Salmon 1986; Braun 1998). Following this, a naive solution to Frege’s puzzle has to
provide an explanation of how our intuitions regarding the truth-values of sentences
like (4) and (8) can be misleading. Here an advocate of (M) could build on Salmon’s
(1986) or Braun’s (1998) naive solution to Frege’s puzzle in connectionwith the direct-
reference theory of belief reports. Therefore, I will call (M) also ‘the naive version of
the Multiple Relation Theory’.
The discussion between the naive and the contextualist version of the Multiple
Relation Theory can be compared with the discussion between the naive version of the
direct-reference theory of belief reports advocated by Salmon (1986) andBraun (1998)
and the contextualist version of the direct-reference theory of belief reports advocated
by Crimmins and Perry (1989) and Crimmins (1992). A contextualist theory has the
advantage that it can take our intuitions regarding the truth-values of sentences like
(4) and (8) seriously, whereas a naive theory has the advantage that it does not have to
introduce modes of presentation as unarticulated constituents; i.e. contents for which
no word or morpheme in the sentence stands for. Therefore, just like in connection
with the direct-reference theory of belief reports, prima facie, also in connection with
the Multiple Relation Theory both a naive and a contextualist version of the theory
seem to be serious options. However, in the next section, I will argue with an example
from Schiffer that together with the special-case consequence and Frege’s constraint
the naive version of the Multiple Relation Theory leads to contradictions. Since, as
we have seen above, the naive version of the Multiple Relation Theory seems to
be committed to both the special-case consequence and Frege’s constraint, this will
undermine the naive version of the Multiple Relation Theory. We will see that, prima
facie, the same problem does not arise in connection with the contextualist version of
the Multiple Relation Theory.
3 Schiffer’s puzzle
Take the above example of Ralph. From Ralph’s sincere and reflective utterance of
‘KarolWojtyła is Polish’ and ‘It is not the case that John Paul II. is Polish’ we infer that
both (4) and (5) are true. This means that we presuppose the following disquotational
principles connecting sincere assertion and belief, where ‘p’ can be replaced, inside
and outside quotation marks, by any standard English sentence lacking indexical or
pronominal devices or ambiguities (Kripke 1979, pp. 248–249)11:
Footnote 10 continued
Analysis, like Crimmins and Perry’s theory (1989) and Crimmins (1992), has difficulties in explaining this,
the Objectivization Effect would also be a reason to prefer a contextualist version of the Multiple Relation
Theory to a contextualist version of the Relational Analysis.
11 Sentences containing indexical or pronominal devices are excluded, since, for example, from Ralph’s
sincere, reflective utterance of ‘I am hungry’ it does not follow that he believes that I (the author) am hungry
(Kripke 1979, p. 249).
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(D P) If a normal English speaker sincerely and reflectively utters ‘p’, then he/she
believes that p.
(D P ′) If a normal English speaker sincerely and reflectively utters ‘It is not the case
that p’, then he/she disbelieves that p.12
Analogous principles can be formulated for French, German etc.
Taken in their obvious intent, also (D P) and (D P ′) seem to be self-evident truths.
In particular, (D P) and (D P ′) seem to be true of belief ascriptions of the form ‘A
believes that S’. For example, if a normal English speaker sincerely and reflectively
utters ‘Ralph believes that snow is white’, we usually infer that the speaker believes
that Ralph believes that snow is white. Similarly, if a normal English speaker sincerely
and reflectively utters ‘It is not the case that Ralph believes that snow is white’, we
usually infer that the speaker disbelieves that Ralph believes that snow is white.13
Now, Schiffer (2006, p. 363) notes that in the example of Ralph even a rational,
normal English speaker who knows that ‘Karol Wojtyła = John Paul II.’ is true could
sincerely and reflectively utter both (4) and (12); e.g. if the speaker has Fregean
intuitions regarding the truth-values of sentences like (4) and (12).
(4) Ralph believes that Karol Wojtyła is Polish.
(12) It is not the case that Ralph believes that John Paul II. is Polish.
Assume that Peter is such a speaker. Together with (D P) and (D P ′), it would follow
that both (13) and (14) are true.
(13) Peter believes that Ralph believes that Karol Wojtyła is Polish.
(14) Peter disbelieves that Ralph believes that John Paul II. is Polish.
If (13) and (14) are true, then, according to (S), so are (15) and (16).
(15) Karol Wojtyła is believed by Peter to be someone such that Ralph believes that
he is Polish.
12 Note that (D P ′) follows from (D P) and the fact that to disbelieve that p means to believe that it is not
the case that p, since the following principle is simply an instance of (D P), where ‘p’ is again restricted
to standard English sentences lacking indexical or pronominal devices or ambiguities:
(D P*) If a normal English speaker sincerely and reflectively utters ‘It is not the case that p’, then he/she
believes that it is note the case that p.
13 One could object that we usually also infer that a speaker does not believe that John Paul II. is Polish if
the speaker is not disposed to sincerely and reflectively utter ‘John Paul II. is Polish’. Nevertheless, so called
Naive Russellians, like Salmon (1986) and Braun (1998), have questioned the disquotational principle we
seem to invoke when we make such inferences:
(SD P) If a normal English speaker is not disposed to sincerely and reflectively utter ‘p’, then he/she
does not believe that p.
This is certainly related to Salmon’s and Braun’s claim that our intuitions regarding the truth-values of
sentences like (4) and (8) can be misleading. However, even philosophers like Salmon and Braun who
question our intuitions regarding the truth-values of sentences like (4) and (8) do not question (D P) or
(D P ′). They only question (SD P). Salmon (2011) even argues that principles like (D P) and (D P ′) are
virtually analytic; i.e. that every instance of the principles is true by virtue of pure semantics. Moreover,
even if our intuitions regarding the truth-values of sentences like (4) and (8) were misleading, it would not
follow that we have to reject (D P) or (D P ′) for belief ascriptions like (4) and (8) or their negation. It would
only follow that the inferred beliefs can be false.
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(16) John Paul II. is disbelieved by Peter to be someone such that Ralph believes that
he is Polish.
According to (M), (15) then has the logical form in (17), and (16) has the logical form
in (18), where B E L stands for the three-place predicate ‘x is believed by y to be
someone/something such that φi t ’ and DI S stands for the three-place predicate ‘x is
disbelieved by y to be someone/something such that φi t ’:14
(17) B E L (Karol Wojtyła, Peter, λz[R(bel,3)(Ralph, λx[x is Polish], z)]).
(18) DI S (Karol Wojtyła, Peter, λz[R(bel,3)(Ralph, λx[x is Polish], z)]).
From this, in turn, it would follow together with Frege’s constraint that Karol Wojtyła
is presented to Peter by two modes of presentation without him recognising that these
are modes of presentation of one and the same person. However, since Peter believes
‘Karol Wojtyła = John Paul II.’ to be true, we can simply assume that Wojtyła is not
presented to Peter by two modes of presentation without him recognising that these
are modes of presentation of one and the same person. This is Schiffer’s puzzle.
Schiffer’s puzzle shows that together with the special-case consequence the naive
version of the Multiple Relation Theory, i.e. (M), leads to instances of the problem
of rationality regarding de re belief that violate Frege’s constraint. Together with the
claim that the naive version of the Multiple Relation Theory is committed to both the
special-case consequence and Frege’s constraint, this would refute the naive version
of the Multiple Relation Theory.
Prima facie, the same problem does not arise in connection with the contextualist
version of the Multiple Relation Theory. Even if Peter does not have two modes of
presentation of Karol Wojtyła, he could still attribute two such modes of presentation
to Ralph. In this case, according to (M ′), (15) would have the logical form in (19),
and (16) would have the logical form in (20), where TK W and T ′K W are the modes of
presentation of Karol Wojtyła that Peter attributes to Ralph.
(19) B E L (Karol Wojtyła, Peter, λz[R(bel,3)(Ralph, 〈λx[x is Polish], TPol〉, 〈z,
TK W 〉)]).
(20) DI S (Karol Wojtyła, Peter, λz[R(bel,3)(Ralph, 〈λx[x is Polish], TPol〉, 〈z,
T ′K W 〉)]).
Now, according to (19) and (20), Karol Wojtyła is not both believed and disbelieved
by Peter to be someone Ralph believes to be Polish, but rather he is believed by Peter
to be someone Ralph believes under TK W to be Polish, and disbelieved by Peter to be
someone Ralph believes under T ′K W to be Polish. Since from this it does not follow
together with Frege’s constraint that Karol Wojtyła is presented to Peter by two modes
of presentation without him recognising that these are modes of presentation of one
14 Note that although it is very likely that in the above example Peter attributes two modes of presentation
of KarolWojtyła to Ralph, according to (M), these modes of presentation are not part of the truth-conditions
of sentences like (13) and (14) and (15) and (16) (respectively). For example, according to (M), both the
embedded sentence of (13) and the embedded sentence of (14) have the logical form in (9):
(9) R(bel,3) (Ralph, λx [x is Polish], Karol Wojtyła).
Although Russell does not discuss embedded cases, there is no in-principle obstacle to extending the




and the same person, prima facie, the contextualist version of the Multiple Relation
Theory provides a solution to Schiffer’s puzzle.
In Sect. 5, I will discuss such a contextualist solution to Schiffer’s puzzle in more
detail. But first I will briefly discuss the possibility to reject the special-case conse-
quence or Frege’s constraint within the naive version of the Multiple Relation Theory.
For example, in (Salmon 2006), Salmon replies to Schiffer’s objection that the direct-
reference theory of belief reports is not committed to (S), but to counter-instances
of (S). Therefore, next, I will briefly present Schiffer’s puzzle in connection with the
direct-reference theory of belief reports. Following this, I will argue that, unlike the
direct-reference theory of belief reports, the naive version of the Multiple Relation
Theory cannot solve Schiffer’s puzzle by rejecting the special-case consequence or
Frege’s constraint.
4 Rejecting the special-case consequence or Frege’s constraint
As said above, Schiffer first presented his puzzle as an objection to the so called
direct-reference theory of belief reports. For example, following the work of Marcus
(1961), Donnellan (1970), Perry (1977), Kripke (1980) and Kaplan (1989), so called
Neo-Russellians, like Salmon (1986) and Braun (1998), hold that:
(N R1) The propositions we say and believe are Russellian propositions; i.e. struc-
tured propositions whose basic components are the objects and properties our
thoughts and speech acts are about.
(N R2) Names and other singular terms (pronouns, simple demonstratives, indexicals)
function as directly referential terms; i.e. the semantic content of ‘n is F’ in a
context c is the singular proposition 〈o, Φ〉, where o is the referent of the name
n in c and Φ is the property expressed by the predicate F in c.
This is also known as the direct-reference theory.15 Moreover, Salmon and Braun
advocate the following theory of belief reports:
(N R3) A sentence of the form ‘n believes/disbelieves that S’ is true in a context c iff
the referent of the name n in c believes/disbelieves the proposition expressed
by the sentence S in c.16
Since the theory consisting of (N R1), (N R2), and (N R3) is committed to a naive
solution to Frege’s puzzle according to which our intuitions regarding the truth-values
of sentences like (4) and (8) can be misleading, it is sometimes referred to as ‘the naive
version of the direct-reference theory of belief reports’.17
15 As the name suggests, just like the Multiple Relation Theory, the Neo-Russellian theory also goes back
to Russell (1905, 1910-1911, 1912). However, according to Russell, the only directly referential terms are
so called logically proper names; i.e. demonstratives like ‘this’ and ‘that’ which refer to sense-data or other
objects of immediate acquaintance.
16 Here to disbelieve a proposition p means to believe its negation.
17 Not all direct-reference theorists accept (N R3). For example, Crimmins and Perry (1989) and Crimmins
(1992) hold that ‘believe’ expresses a three-place relation holding between agents, Russellian propositions
and contextually determined modes of presentation. This is also known as ‘the contextualist version of
the direct-reference theory of belief reports’, since it provides a contextualist solution to Frege’s puzzle
according to which there can be circumstances in which (4) is true and (8) is false.
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In (Schiffer 2006), Schiffer argues that the naive version of the direct-reference
theory of belief reports is committed to both the special-case consequence and Frege’s
constraint. For example, according to the naive version of the direct-reference theory
of belief reports, to believe of an object x , de re, that it is F simply seems to be to
believe de dicto the singular proposition about x that it is F . Therefore, according to
Schiffer, also within the naive version of the direct-reference theory of belief reports
the inferences from (13) and (14) to (15) and (16) are valid. Moreover, according to
the naive version of the direct-reference theory of belief reports, (15) has the logical
form in (21), and (16) has the logical form in (22), where B stands for the two-place
belief relation holding between agents and Russellian propositions.
(21) B E L (Karol Wojtyła, Peter, λz[B(Ralph, that z is Polish)]).
(22) DI S (Karol Wojtyła, Peter, λz[B(Ralph, that z is Polish)]).
Since from this it would follow together with Frege’s constraint that Karol Wojtyła is
presented to Peter by two modes of presentation without him recognising that these
are modes of presentation of one and the same person, we see that together with the
special-case consequence also the naive version of the direct-reference theory of belief
reports leads to instances of the problemof rationality regarding de re belief that violate
Frege’s constraint. Thus, if the naive version of the direct-reference theory of belief
reports were committed to both the special-case consequence and Frege’s constraint,
this would refute the naive version of the direct reference theory of belief reports.18
In (Salmon 2006, pp. 271–272), Salmon replies to Schiffer’s objection that the naive
version of the direct-reference theory of belief reports is not committed to (S), but to
counter-instances of (S). Braun (2006, p. 376) agrees with Salmon on this point. As
Salmon (2006, pp. 271–272) rightly points out, within the naive version of the direct-
reference theory of belief reports, one example of a counter-instance of (S) is provided
by Schiffer’s puzzle itself. If (13) and (14) are true, then, according to the naive version
of the direct-reference theory of belief reports, Peter both believes and disbelieves the
singular proposition 〈〈Ralph, 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉〉, believing〉. However,
Peter does not thereby both believe and disbelieve the singular proposition 〈Karol
Wojtyła, being (someone) such that Ralph believes that he is Polish〉. For example, if
Peter believes ‘Karol Wojtyła = John Paul II.’ to be true, then, as a rational, normal
English speaker, he is not disposed to sincerely and reflectively utter both (25) and
(26).
(25) Karol Wojtyła is (someone) such that Ralph believes that he is Polish.
(26) It is not the case that John Paul II. is (someone) such that Ralph believes that he
is Polish.
Since, according to the naive version of the direct-reference theory of belief reports,
(15) is true if and only if Peter believes the singular proposition 〈Karol Wojtyła, being
18 Note that Schiffer’s puzzle is not a problem for the contextualist version of the direct-reference theory
of belief reports, since, according to Crimmins and Perry, (15) has the logical form in (23), and (16) has
the logical form in (24), where m and m′ are two (contextually determined) modes of presentation of the
singular proposition that Karol Wojtyła is Polish that Peter attributes to Ralph.
(23) B E L (Karol Wojtyła, Peter, λz[B(Ralph, that z is Polish, m)]).
(24) DI S (Karol Wojtyła, Peter, λz[B(Ralph, that z is Polish, m′)]).
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(someone) such that Ralph believes that he is Polish〉, and (16) is true if and only if
Peter disbelieves 〈Karol Wojtyła, being (someone) such that Ralph believes that he is
Polish〉, it follows that although, in the above example, both (13) and (14) are true,
according to the naive version of the direct-reference theory of belief reports, (15) or
(16) is not.
This leads to the question whether a similar solution to Schiffer’s puzzle is also
available within the naive version of the Multiple Relation Theory. I will argue that it
is not. According to (M), both the propositional content of (4) and the propositional
content of (8) consist of the three-place belief relation R(bel,3), Ralph, the property of
being Polish, and Karol Wojtyła. From this, in turn, it follows within the naive version
of the Multiple Relation Theory that (13) has the logical form in (27), and that (14)
has the logical form in (28).
(27) R(bel,5) (Peter, λxλyλz[R(bel,3)(x, y, z)], Ralph, λx [x is Polish], Karol Woj-
tyła).
(28) R(dis,5) (Peter, λxλyλz[R(bel,3)(x, y, z)], Ralph, λx [x is Polish], Karol Woj-
tyła).
Since this seems to be tantamount to saying that Karol Wojtyła is both believed and
disbelieved by Peter to be believed by Ralph to be Polish, it is very likely that within
the naive version of the Multiple Relation Theory Schiffer’s puzzle does not provide a
counter-instance of the special-case consequence. This suggests that, unlike the naive
version of the direct-reference theory of belief reports, the naive version of theMultiple
Relation Theory leads to instances of the problem of rationality regarding de re belief
that violate Frege’s constraint.
If the naive version of theMultipleRelationTheory leads to instances of the problem
of rationality regarding de re belief that violate Frege’s constraint, then we have to
reject the naive version of the Multiple Relation Theory or Frege’s constraint. In
(Schiffer 2006, pp. 364–365), Schiffer notes that, prima facie, an advocate of the
naive version of the direct-reference theory of belief reports could solve his puzzle by
rejecting Frege’s constraint. For example, in order to explain that a brilliant logician
like Ralph can rationally both believe and disbelieve the singular proposition 〈Karol
Wojtyła, being Polish〉, advocates of the naive version of the direct-reference theory
of belief reports already accept a version of Frege’s constraint for propositional modes
of presentation; i.e. Salmon’s constraint (see, for example, Salmon 1986).
(SC) If a proposition p is rationally both believed and disbelieved by an agent k, then
there are modes of presentation m and m′ such that
(a) p is believed by k under m,
(b) p is disbelieved by k under m′, and
(c) k does not take m and m′ to be modes of presentation of one and the same
proposition.
Following this, Schiffer notes that an advocate of the naive version of the direct-
reference theory of belief reports could respond to his objection that although Karol
Wojtyła is not presented to Peter by twomodes of presentationwithout him recognising
that these are modes of presentation of one and the same person, the singular propo-
sition 〈〈Ralph, 〈Karol Wojtyła, being Polish〉〉, believing〉 is nevertheless presented
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to him by two modes of presentation without him recognising that these are modes
of presentation of one and the same proposition. Since Peter believes the proposition
under one mode of presentation and disbelieves it under the other, the solution goes,
Peter cannot be convicted of irrationality. However, Schiffer (2006, p. 365) also notes
that it is very unclear how to construe the propositional modes of presentation implied
by Salmon’s constraint such that Salmon’s constraint does not commit the naive ver-
sion of the direct-reference theory of belief reports to Frege’s constraint. Moreover,
such a solution to Schiffer’s puzzle is not even available within the naive version of
the Multiple Relation Theory. According to the naive version of the Multiple Relation
Theory, the belief relation holding between agents, properties/relations, and objects is
not reducible to a belief relation holding between agents and Russellian propositions.
Therefore, an advocate of the naive version of the Multiple Relation Theory cannot
simply reject Frege’s constraint, and, instead, accept a version of Frege’s constraint
for propositional modes of presentation.
We see that it is very likely that within the naive version of the Multiple Rela-
tion Theory the solution to Schiffer’s puzzle can neither be to reject the special-case
consequence nor to reject Frege’s constraint. In other words, the naive version of the
Multiple Relation Theory has to provide an explanation of how both (27) and (28)
can be true, although Peter is both a brilliant logician and fully rational. Since neither
R(bel,3), nor Ralph, nor the property of being Polish, nor Karol Wojtyła is presented to
Peter by two modes of presentation without him recognising that these are modes of
presentation of one and the same object/property/relation, it is very unclear whether
the naive version of the Multiple Relation Theory can explain this. An advocate of the
Multiple Relation could respond that this only shows that we have to reject the naive
version of the Multiple Relation Theory, and, instead, accept the contextualist version
of the Multiple Relation Theory. However, next, I will argue with new Schiffer cases
that even the contextualist version of the Multiple Relation Theory leads to instances
of the problem of rationality regarding de re belief that violate Frege’s constraint. This
will undermine the Multiple Relation Theory in general.
5 Schiffer’s puzzle again
According to the contextualist version of the Multiple Relation Theory, the modes of
presentation implied by (M ′) are simply the modes of presentation implied by Frege’s
constraint. Otherwise, the contextualist version of the Multiple Relation Theory could
not explain that both (4) and (5) can be true of a rational logician like Ralph.
(4) Ralph believes that Karol Wojtyła is Polish.
(5) Ralph disbelieves that John Paul II. is Polish.
According to (M ′), (4) has the logical form in (10), and (5) has the logical form in (29),
where TK W and T ′K W are two distinct (contextually determined) (types of) modes of
presentation of Karol Wojtyła.
(10) R(bel,3) (Ralph, 〈λx [x is Polish], TPol〉, 〈Karol Wojtyła, TK W 〉).
(29) R(dis,3) (Ralph, 〈λx [x is Polish], TPol〉, 〈Karol Wojtyła, T ′K W 〉).
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Now, in order to explain that both (10) and (29) can be true of a rational logician like
Ralph, an advocate of the contextualist version of the Multiple Relation Theory is
committed to the claim that Ralph does not recognise that TK W and T ′K W are modes
of presentation of one and the same person. Since this is tantamount to saying that
the modes of presentation implied by (10) and (29) play the role defined by Frege’s
constraint, it follows that according to the contextualist version of theMultipleRelation
Theory themodes of presentation implied by (M ′) are simply themodes of presentation
implied by Frege’s constraint.
Both (M ′) and Frege’s constraint leave open what modes of presentation are. In
this section, I will discuss the three main conceptions of the modes of presentation
implied by (M ′) (and Frege’s constraint), and I will argue that, ultimately, on all three
conceptions (M ′) leads to instances of the problem of rationality that violate Frege’s
constraint. This will suggest that also the contextualist version of theMultiple Relation
Theory does not provide a solution to Schiffer’s puzzle.
A first construal of themodes of presentation implied by (M ′) and Frege’s constraint
could be that the modes of presentation implied by (M ′) and Frege’s constraint are
expressions of a public language. According to such a construal of the modes of
presentation implied by (M ′) and Frege’s constraint, (4) has to be analysed as (30),
and (5) has to be analysed as (31), where the two public language names ‘Karol
Wojtyła’ and ‘John Paul II.’ are the ways Karol Wojtyła is presented to Ralph.
(30) R(bel,3) (Ralph, 〈λx [x is Polish], ‘x is Polish’〉, 〈Karol Wojtyła, ‘Karol
Wojtyła’〉).
(31) R(dis,3) (Ralph, 〈λx [x is Polish], ‘x is Polish’〉, 〈Karol Wojtyła, ‘John
Paul II.’〉).
Since, in the above example, Ralph does not recognise that ‘Karol Wojtyła’ and ‘John
Paul II.’ are names of one and the same person, prima facie, expressions of a public
language seem to be good candidates for the role defined by Frege’s constraint. How-
ever, in connection with Kripke’s Paderewski example (Kripke 1979, pp. 265–266),
such a conception of the modes of presentation implied by Frege’s constraint reaches
its limits; i.e. it leads to an instance of the problem of rationality regarding de re belief
that violates Frege’s constraint.
In Kripke’s Paderewski example, Kripke’s Peter gets introduced twice to one and
the same name ‘Paderewski’ without him recognising it. Therefore, even as a brilliant
and fully rational logician Peter could sincerely and reflectively utter both (32) and
(33).
(32) Paderewski has musical talent.
(33) It is not the case that Paderewski has musical talent.
However, according to the public language conception of the modes of presentation
implied by Frege’s constraint, there would be a mode of presentation m such that
Paderewski is both believed and disbelieved by Peter to have musical talent under m;
i.e. the public language name ‘Paderewski’. Thus, on the public language conception
of the modes of presentation implied by Frege’s constraint, Kripke’s example would
lead to an instance of the problem of rationality that violates Frege’s constraint.
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Following Kripke’s Paderewski example, an advocate of the contextualist version
of the Multiple Relation Theory could claim that, instead of expressions of a public
language, themodes of presentation implied by (M ′) andFrege’s constraint are bundles
of properties or files of information.19 For example, it is very likely that in Kripke’s
example Peter has two distinct files of information of Paderewski; one file containing,
amongothers, the information being a politician, andonefile containing, amongothers,
the information being a musician. Following this, an advocate of the contextualist
version of the Multiple Relation Theory could claim that since Paderewski is believed
by Peter to have musical talent under one file, and disbelieved by Peter to have musical
talent under the other file, without him recognising that these are files of one and the
same person, Peter cannot be convicted of irrationality. However, even on the files of
information conception of the modes of presentation implied by (M ′) the contextualist
version of theMultiple Relation Theory leads to instances of the problem of rationality
that violate Frege’s constraint.
Assume that although Harry has two names for Cicero in his public language, he
has only one file of information of Cicero; i.e. the file containing the information being
a Roman orator, being named ‘Cicero’, and being named ‘Tully’.20 Thus, although
Harry has two names for Cicero, he associates one and the same information with
‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’. Nevertheless, Harry could accept ‘Cicero was a Roman’ without
being disposed to accept ‘Tully was a Roman’; i.e. if Harry is irrational or not very
reflective.Moreover, following this, a rational, normal English speaker like Sally could
be disposed to sincerely and reflectively utter (34) and (35) even if she knows both that
‘Cicero = Tully’ is true and that Harry associates one and the same file of information
with ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’; e.g. if Sally has strong sententialist intuitions.21
(34) Harry believes that Cicero was a Roman.
(35) Harry does not believe that Tully was a Roman.
Together with (D P) and (D P ′), it would follow that both (36) and (37) are true.
(36) Sally believes that Harry believes that Cicero was a Roman.
(37) Sally disbelieves that Harry believes that Tully was a Roman.
If (36) and (37) are true, then, according to the special-case consequence, so are (38)
and (39).
(38) Cicero is believed by Sally to be someone such that Harry believes that he was
a Roman.
(39) Tully is disbelieved by Sally to be someone such that Harry believes that he
was a Roman.
19 See for example Recanati’s theory of mental files (Recanati 2012).
20 We could even assume that Harry never distinguished between two Cicero files in the past. For example,
we could assume that Harry got the information by reading a book, where it was written that Cicero was a
Roman orator who is also called ‘Tully’.
21 With sententialist intuitions I mean that Sally thinks that a sentence of the form ‘A believes that S’ is
true if and only if the referent of A believes the sentence S to be true, or at least that she has intuitions that
would be in accordance with such an analysis of belief ascriptions.
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However, since Sally knows that Harry associates one and the same file of informa-
tion with ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’, according to the file of information conception of the
modes of presentation implied by (M ′), (38) has the logical form in (40), and (39)
has the logical form in (41), where FCicero is the Cicero file that Sally attributes to
Harry.22
(40) B E L (Cicero, Sally, λz[R(bel,3)(Harry, 〈λx[x was a Roman], TRom〉, 〈z,
FCicero〉)]).
(41) DI S (Cicero, Sally, λz[R(bel,3)(Harry, 〈λx[x was a Roman], TRom〉, 〈z,
FCicero〉)]).
From this, in turn, it would follow together with Frege’s constraint that Cicero is
presented to Sally by two modes of presentation without her recognising that these
are modes of presentation of one and the same person.23 However, since Sally knows
that ‘Cicero = Tully’ is true, we can simply assume that Cicero is not presented to
Sally by two modes of presentation without her recognising that these are modes of
presentation of one and the same person. It follows that on the files of information
conception of the modes of presentation implied by (M ′) the contextualist version of
theMultiple Relation Theory leads to instances of the problem of rationality regarding
de re belief that violate Frege’s constraint.
An advocate of the contextualist version of the Multiple Relation Theory could
respond that this only shows that in the above example the modes of presenta-
tion implied by (M ′) are expressions of a public language; i.e. that (38) has to be
analysed as (42), and that (39) has to be analysed as (43), where the two names
‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ play the role of the modes of presentation that Sally attributes to
s Harry.
(42) B E L (Cicero, Sally, λz[R(bel,3)(Harry, 〈λx[x was a Roman], TRom〉, 〈z,
‘Cicero’〉)]).
(43) DI S (Cicero, Sally, λz[R(bel,3)(Harry, 〈λx[x was a Roman], TRom〉, 〈z,
‘Tully’〉)]).
However, we have seen that such a public language conception of themodes of presen-
tation implied by (M ′) does not provide a solution to Kripke’s Paderewski example.
Therefore, such a solution to the Cicero/Tully example would commit an advocate of
(M ′) to a mixed view regarding the modes of presentation implied by (M ′); i.e. that
22 Note that according to the file of information conception of the modes of presentation implied by (M ′),
the contextually determined file of Sally’s utterance of (34) has to be the file that Harry associates with
his uses of ‘Cicero’, and the contextually determined file of Sally’s utterance of (35) has to be the file
that Harry associates with his uses of ‘Tully’. Otherwise, it would be very unclear what it means to be a
contextually determined mode of presentation according to the file of information conception of the modes
of presentation implied by (M ′). Thus, since Harry associates one and the same file of information with
‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’, according to the file of information conception of the modes of presentation implied
by (M ′), the contextually determined file of Sally’s utterance of (34) is simply the contextually determined
file of Sally’s utterance of (35); i.e. FCicero.
23 Note that here we do not apply Frege’s constraint to Harry’s beliefs, but to Sally’s beliefs. Since, unlike
Harry, Sally is rational, from (40) and (41) it follows together with Frege’s constraint that Cicero is presented
to Sally by two modes of presentation without her recognising that these are modes of presentation of one
and the same person.
123
Synthese
the modes of presentation implied by (M ′) are sometimes files of information, like in
Kripke’s Paderewski example, and sometimes expressions of a public language, like
in the Cicero/Tully example, however, as we have seen above, according to the con-
textualist version of the Multiple Relation Theory, the modes of presentation implied
by (M ′) are simply the modes of presentation implied by Frege’s constraint. Since
it is very unlikely that the functional role defined by Frege’s constraint is sometimes
played by public language expressions, and sometimes played by files of information,
also a mixed view of the modes of presentation implied by (M ′) is not very plausible.
This suggests that within the contextualist version of the Multiple Relation Theory
the solution to the Cicero/Tully example cannot simply be to analyse (38) as (42) and
(39) as (43).
In light of this, an advocate of the contextualist version of the Multiple Relation
Theory could claim that, instead of public language expressions or files of information,
the modes of presentation implied by (M ′) are expressions of a language of thought
L OT . For example, an advocate of the contextualist version of the Multiple Rela-
tion Theory could claim that although Kripke’s Peter does not have two names for
Paderewski in his public language, he has two names for Paderewski in his language
of thought. Prima facie, the same could be said of Harry; i.e. that although Harry has
only one file of information of Cicero, just like he has two names for Cicero in his pub-
lic language, he also has two names for Cicero in his language of thought. However,
as Braun (1998, fn 39) points out, in connection with Kripke’s Paderewski example
such a solution presupposes that the language of thought is not the public language;
i.e. English. Otherwise, Peter would also have only one name for Paderewski in his
language of thought. But then from the fact that Harry has two names for Cicero in
his public language it does not automatically follow that he also has two names for
Cicero in his language of thought. On the contrary, if Harry’s language of thought
is not English, then, since Harry never distinguished two mental files of Cicero, it is
very likely that he also never distinguished two mental names of Cicero. This suggests
that in connection with the Harry/Sally example the L OT conception of the modes
of presentation implied by (M ′) leads to a similar problem as the file of information
conception of the modes of presentation implied by (M ′).
We see that on the three main conceptions of the modes of presentation implied
by (M ′) and Frege’s constraint also the contextualist version of the Multiple Relation
Theory leads to instances of the problem of rationality regarding de re belief that
violate Frege’s constraint. This suggests that, just like the naive version of theMultiple
Relation Theory, ultimately, also the contextualist version of the Multiple Relation
Theory does not provide a solution to Schiffer’s puzzle. This undermines the Multiple
Relation Theory in general.
6 Conclusions
Unlike the naive version of the direct-reference theory of belief reports, the naive
version of the Multiple Relation Theory, i.e. (M), seems to be committed to both
the special-case consequence and Frege’s constraint. Since, together with the special-
case consequence and Frege’s constraint, the naive version of the Multiple Relation
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Theory leads to contradictions, this undermines the naive version of the Multiple
Relation Theory. This was Schiffer’s puzzle. Moreover, even if the naive version of
the Multiple Relation Theory is not committed to both the special-case consequence
and Frege’s constraint, it has to provide an explanation of how both (27) and (28)
can be true, although Peter is both a brilliant logician and fully rational. Since neither
R(bel,3), nor Ralph, nor the property of being Polish, nor Karol Wojtyła is presented to
Peter by two modes of presentation without him recognising that these are modes of
presentation of one and the same object/property/relation, it is very unclear how the
naive version of the Multiple Relation Theory could explain this.
In order to solve Schiffer’s puzzle, an advocate of the Multiple Relation Theory
could reject the naive version of the Multiple Relation Theory, and, instead, accept the
contextualist version of the Multiple Relation Theory; i.e. (M ′). However, as we have
seen in Sect. 5, just like the naive version of the Multiple Relation Theory, also the
contextualist version of the Multiple Relation theory leads to instances of the problem
of rationality regarding de re belief that violate Frege’s constraint. Therefore, Schiffer’s
puzzle not only undermines the naive version of the Multiple Relation Theory, but the
Multiple Relation Theory in general.
For advocates of theMultiple Relation Theory, a possible way out of the problem is
to claim with Jubien (2001) that the relata of the belief relation are always properties
and relations; i.e. that there is nothing like de re belief, and, therefore, that there is
nothing like the problem of rationality regarding de re belief or Schiffer’s puzzle.
However, most advocates of the Multiple Relation Theory hold that, in addition to
properties and relations, also individuals can be the relata of the belief relation.
Another possibility would be to distinguish between the assertoric content of a
sentence (what we say with an utterance of the sentence) and its semantic content (the
meaning of the sentence). Following this, an advocate of theMultiple Relation Theory
could claim that (M) and (M ′) are theories of assertoric content, and not theories of
semantic content. Therefore, the solution to Schiffer’s puzzle goes, although a speaker
who accepts (4) and (12) both believes and disbelieves one and the same assertoric
objects, he cannot be convicted of irrationality, since the sentences he thereby uses do
not have the same semantic content. However, in order to offer a complete solution
to Schiffer’s puzzle, such a theory would have to say what the semantic content of
sentences like (4) and (8) is, and how sentences like (4) and (8) can have different
semantic contents.
Another possible way out of Schiffer’s puzzle would be to claim with Neo-Rus-
sellians, like Salmon (1986, 2006) and Braun (1998, 2006), that a sentence like (1)
does not have the logical form in (2a), but rather the logical form in (2b). Following
this, one could argue with Salmon that Schiffer’s puzzle provides a counter-instance
of (S), and, therefore, does not lead to instances of the problem of rationality regarding
de re belief that violate Frege’s constraint. However, in (Rinner 2020), I argue that
although the naive version of the direct-reference theory of belief reports advocated
by Salmon and Braun is not committed to (S), it nevertheless leads to instances of
the problem of rationality regarding de re belief that violate Frege’s constraint. Since
the same problem does not arise for the contextualist version of the direct-reference
theory of belief reports advocated, among others, by Crimmins and Perry (1989) and
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Crimmins (1992), unlike the naive version, the contextualist version of the direct-
reference theory of belief reports would still provide a solution to Schiffer’s puzzle.
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